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Abstract
Entrepreneurial groups face a twinned challenge: recognizing new ideas and implementing 
them. Recent research suggests that connectivity reaching outside the group channels new 
ideas, while closure makes it possible to act on them. By contrast, we argue that entrepre-
neurship is not about importing ideas but about generating new knowledge by recombin-
ing resources. In contrast to the brokerage-plus-closure perspective, we identify a distinctive 
network position, intercohesion, which is found at the overlap of cohesive group structures. 
The multiple insiders at this intercohesive position participate in dense cohesive ties that 
provide close familiarity with the operations of the members in their groups. Because they 
are members of multiple cohesive groups, they have familiar access to diverse resources. First, 
we test whether intercohesion contributes to higher group performance. Second, because 
entrepreneurship is a process of creative disruption, we test intercohesion’s contribution 
to group instability. Third, we move from dynamic methods to historical network analysis 
and demonstrate that coherence is a property of interwoven lineages of cohesion that are 
built up through an ongoing pattern of separation and reunification. Business groups use 
this pattern of interweaving to manage instability while benefitting from intercohesion. To 
study the evolution of business groups, we construct a dataset that records personnel ties 
among the largest 1,696 Hungarian enterprises from 1987–2001.
Zusammenfassung
Unternehmerisch tätige Gruppen stehen vor zwei Herausforderungen: neue Ideen zu erken-
nen und sie zu implementieren. Jüngste Forschungsergebnisse unterstellen, dass Konnekti-
vität, die über eine Gruppe hinausreicht, ihr neue Ideen zuführt, während Geschlossenheit 
der Gruppe ermöglicht, diese Ideen umzusetzen. Demgegenüber argumentieren wir, dass 
Unternehmertum nichts mit dem Import von Ideen zu tun hat, sondern damit, neues Wis-
sen zu generieren, indem vorhandene Ressourcen neu kombiniert werden. Dabei identifi-
zieren wir eine konkrete Netzwerkposition, die wir als „Intercohesion“ bezeichnen. Inhaber 
einer solchen interkohäsiven Position sind „Mehrfach-Insider“: Sie partizipieren an festen 
kohäsiven Beziehungen, durch die sie mit dem Handeln der Mitglieder ihrer Gruppen eng 
vertraut sind. Als Mitglieder mehrerer kohäsiver Gruppen haben sie mühelosen Zugang zu 
einer Vielfalt von Ressourcen. Zunächst untersuchen wir, ob Interkohäsion zu einer höhe-
ren Gruppenleistung beiträgt. In einem zweiten Schritt testen wir den Beitrag der Interko-
häsion zur Instabilität von Gruppen, da Unternehmertum ein Prozess der kreativen Unter-
brechung eingefahrener Abläufe und Strukturen ist. In einem dritten Schritt wenden wir 
uns von dem dynamischen Fokus hin zur Perspektive einer historischen Netzwerkanalyse 
und zeigen, dass Kohärenz eine Eigenschaft der miteinander verwobenen Abstammungsli-
nien ist, die durch ein sich wiederholendes Muster von Trennung und Wiedervereinigung 
entstehen. Unternehmerisch tätige Gruppen verwenden dieses Muster, um Instabilität zu 
managen und dabei die Vorteile der Interkohäsion zu nutzen. Zur Untersuchung der Ent-
wicklung unternehmerisch tätiger Gruppen bauen wir einen Datensatz auf, der über den 
Zeitraum von 1987 bis 2001 die Beziehungen zwischen den Führungskräften der größten 
1.696 ungarischen Unternehmen abbildet.
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Business groups face two key challenges in their entrepreneurial mode of operation: to 
recognize sources of novel ideas and to secure the means to implement them. Recent 
thinking suggests that brokerage ties of connectivity outside the group provide contact 
with new ideas in the environment; and that cohesive ties of closure within the group 
provide trust and mutual understanding for implementation (Burt 2005; Uzzi/Spiro 
2005; Obstfeld 2005). Whereas this brokerage-plus-closure perspective sees innovation 
as importing and implementing ideas, we offer an alternative conception of entrepre-
neurship as recombination. In our view, truly innovative ideas – in the first instance, a 
fresh conceptualization of the problem itself – are not free-floating outside the group.
Instead of importing ideas or information, the challenge is to generate knowledge. It 
follows that the work of recombination that generates new knowledge requires intense 
interaction and deeply familiar access to knowledge bases and productive resources, as 
opposed to long-distance contact and casual access. From this perspective, entrepre-
neurship, as an enabling capacity, proves productive not so much by encouraging the 
smooth flow of information or the confirmation of fixed identities but by fostering the 
generative and productive friction that disrupts the received categories of “business as 
usual” and enables the redefinition, redeployment, and recombination of resources. Yet, 
a simple expansion of cohesive group membership would not be sufficient: recombina-
tion requires interaction across diversity. 
Therefore, we argue that entrepreneurship in the business-group context is driven by 
the intersection of cohesive groups where actors have familiar access to diverse re sources 
available for recombination. In making this argument, we draw on Simmel’s ([1922] 
1964) insight that membership in cohesive groups can overlap. With a method that al-
lows us to identify cohesive – yet nonexclusive – groups, we bring theoretical attention 
to the distinctive structural position at their intersection. Our concept of intercohesion 
is a theoretical counterpart to Burt’s (1992) concept of “structural hole” but has dif-
ferent structural properties. Corresponding to our different understanding of the in-
novative process and the structural basis for it, intercohesion, as mutual participation 
in multiple cohesive groups, provides the requisite familiarity and diversity for access 
and for action through a distinctive network topography that is not a summation of 
brokerage and closure. 
We further argue that entrepreneurship has not only structural properties within a syn-
chronic dimension but also dynamic properties along the temporal dimension. Specifi-
cally, entrepreneurial structures are not only creative but are also likely to be disruptive. 
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Thus, our dual task is to analyze structural features that predict group performance and 
to analyze whether and how these same structural features contribute to or undermine 
the continued existence of the group itself.
We propose historical network analysis as a new vantage point from which to re-exam-
ine the essence or constitution of “groupness” itself. The conventional graph snapshot 
of network analysis does not distinguish robust and stable collectivities from transitory 
alignments; it only enables the distinction between denser or sparser network regions. 
Within that conventional framework, it is tempting to focus only on denser regions 
as cohesive structures where strong forces of structural determination hold members 
together. Once we think of groups as histories of cohesion, however, we can loosen the 
conceptual hold of determining structures and envision groups as sites and tools of 
agency (Sewell 1992). We can recognize groups despite temporary losses in density. In 
fact, we often find that the strategic separation between groups within larger units is 
only recognizable through historical analysis. Thus, our analysis addresses a fundamen-
tal sociological question: what is a social group across time in network terms? 
Our analysis proceeds through three tests. In the first test, we find that intercohesion is a 
significant factor explaining outstanding group performance (as measured by high rev-
enue growth). Moving to dynamic models, we find in the second test that intercohesion 
significantly predicts group breakup. Entrepreneurial intercohesion is performance-
enhancing, but comes at the apparent “cost” of group stability. Our findings thus sug-
gest that intercohesion is doubly generative: in the first instance, its creative tensions 
of familiarity and diversity promote group performance, while in the second instance, 
these same tensions foster a creative disruption that generates the dispersion of group 
members who become available for later regrouping.
In a third test, we move from dynamic modeling to historical network analysis to ana-
lyze the coherence of groups in their repeated reconstitutions. Do destabilized groups 
scatter to the winds or do they re-form along patterned lines that would indicate the 
existence of business groups in the proper sense of larger, historically constituted collec-
tivities? To address this question, we develop the concept of lineages of cohesion as a con-
struct that captures the continuous chains of ancestry of the cohesive nuclear structures 
in our prior models. Our approach furthers an agenda to develop social sequence analy-
sis (Stark/Vedres 2006). Whereas sequence analysis typically conceptualizes sequences 
as isolated and linear, sequences of cohesion are conceptualized here as interconnected 
and branching. In our case, the “kinship structure” of business groups is given by the 
reproduction and the exchange of members among nuclear groups across “generations” 
(the years in our study). We find that business groups as larger historical collectivities 
maintain their coherence through interwoven lineages.
Postsocialist Hungary offers an excellent case for examining organizational innovation 
and the historical evolution of business groups. The dislocations and uncertainties fac-
ing state-owned enterprises undergoing privatization, new startups, and foreign-owned 
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subsidiaries can hardly be overstated. With the collapse of COMECON (the trading 
system among Soviet-bloc states) following the demise of the Soviet Union, many firms 
faced the almost total collapse of their once-guaranteed markets. When the institu-
tional framework for corporate forms was established in 1988, the number of corpora-
tions expanded rapidly (from a handful to half a million today). Business networks and 
business groups emerged quickly as organizational experimentation rapidly gathered 
speed to locate or generate markets for products of the group and to buffer members 
from varied uncertainties. Several studies have demonstrated the innovative capacity 
of postsocialist firms and groups in making use of new corporate institutions, such as 
cross-ownership, board ties, and holding structures (Stark 1996; Spicer/McDermott/
Kogut 2000). 
In this context, the new institution of corporate supervisory bodies and boards of di-
rectors offered firms reliable sources of information, access to insider knowledge about 
successes and failures occurring elsewhere in coping with challenges, and a mechanism 
for coordinating actions among strategic business allies. Required by corporate law, the 
institution was entirely novel to Hungarian executives. CEOs and other senior man-
agers whom we interviewed recalled their puzzlement on attending their first board 
meeting; but they also emphasized how quickly firms grasped the possibility of sharing 
directors as an opportunity for coordinating strategy. 
Our dataset documents this process of organizational experimentation and the dynam-
ics of group formation and entrepreneurship. We have collected the names of all eco-
nomic officeholders in Hungary from 1987 to 2001, defining economic officeholders 
as all senior managers and members of the boards of directors and supervisory boards 
of the largest 1,696 companies. With our list of 72,766 names and the exact dates of 
their tenure on these boards, we can construct the personnel ties connecting these larg-
est firms for each year in our study. Our case reaches back to the very moment when 
firms could adopt the newly legalized, corporate form.1 It includes periods of business 
uncertainty involving privatization, transformational recession, marketization, the in-
stitutionalization of economic regulations, massive foreign direct investment (FDI), as 
well as three parliamentary elections.
1 Our study contributes to historical network analysis using large datasets across relatively long 
time frames. Padgett and McLean (2006), for example, develop a multiple network approach to 
study the genesis of the banking form over some eighty years in Renaissance Florence. Powell 
et al. (2005) apply a dynamic network approach to understand the emergence of biotechnology, 
following ties between more than two thousand organizations over a twelve year period. Uzzi 
and Spiro (2005) examine network properties of cohesion and connectivity among a popu-
lation of 2,092 people who worked on 474 Broadway musicals from 1945 to 1989 (see also 
Wuchty/Jones/Uzzi 2007). 
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Network structures for access and action
One prominent feature of business networks is that firms cluster together in cohesive 
groups. Dense ties among the members of the group, it is argued, provide a basis for 
trust and a means for coordinating action (Useem 1980; Uzzi 1997). Cohesive ties en-
able groups to implement projects beyond the capacity of any given firm (Granovetter 
2005). The sharing of risk along these ties buffers groups from uncertainty. Because 
it mitigates the impact of abrupt downturns, risk-spreading in such business-group 
networks lowers the volatility of year-to-year profitability (Lincoln/Gerlach/Ahmadjian 
1996).
Another logic states that business groups might elect to forego high density within the 
group in favor of maintaining more weak ties to firms outside the group. Such a strat-
egy of sacrificing density for diversity economizes network resources by reducing the 
number of redundant ties (Burt 1992). Long-distance ties provide access to more chan-
nels of information outside the group, and this diversity provides a basis for greater 
adaptability. According to this logic, the conservatizing strategy of in-group cohesion 
is maladaptive. This strategy runs the risk of locking the business group into early suc-
cesses, a strategy that will quickly become detrimental in a situation of rapid change 
in which the directionality of disruption cannot be foreseen. The defensive strategy of 
closing ranks risks the chance of creating a false sense of security at a point when the 
actual situation does not call for pitting survival and innovation against one another, 
but for seeking innovation in order to survive. 
Recent developments in network analysis suggest a third strategy: in place of strength-
ening ties within the group or reaching outside it, do both. Some researchers use the 
terms cohesion and connectivity to characterize this strategy (Watts 1999; Moody/
White 2003; Uzzi/Spiro 2005; ); others favor the terminology of closure and brokerage 
(Burt 2005, 2008; Baum/McEvily/Rowley 2007). Common to all is the notion of the 
complementarity of these distinctive network properties, regarded as especially ben-
eficial in cases where the goal is innovation. Brokerage/connectivity provides access to 
ideas and information but in itself lacks the means for implementation. Closure/cohe-
sion provides the means of coordination but lacks diversity for discovery. Together, they 
can compensate for the limitations of each; Obstfeld (2005) has labeled these as the 
“action problem” and the “idea problem.” Exemplary of this approach is the recent study 
by Uzzi and Spiro (2005), who demonstrate that the success of Broadway musicals (in 
which innovation is the ability to produce a “hit”) is a function of enough cohesion (the 
continuity in the composition of the musical “team” from one musical to the next) and 
connectivity (diversity in composition from one musical to the next). 
Our study of business groups in Hungary takes these recent developments as its point 
of departure. With Burt, Uzzi, and others, we share the notion that entrepreneurship (or, 
more generally, innovation) is not facilitated by either closure/cohesion or brokerage/
connectivity alone. Because we agree that the innovative work of recombination in-
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volves a combination of close familiarity and diversity, we similarly seek to identify spe-
cific structural features that promote these social processes. However, we depart from 
the current consensus by arguing for a perspective on entrepreneurial structures that 
does not involve a summation of the conventional dichotomies. Instead, as we elabo-
rate theoretically in the following section, we develop a conception of intercohesion, a 
distinctive network structure built from intersecting cohesive groups. 
Because we see entrepreneurship as disruptive as well as creative, we are attentive to the 
finding of Uzzi and Spiro (2005) that innovation requires some reshuffling of groups. 
Very stable groups (a Broadway musical formed with the same members who worked 
together in a previous musical) and highly unstable groups (a musical in which few 
members had worked together before) are less likely to produce an innovation than 
groups combining members with prior affiliation and novel affiliations. With this in-
sight in mind, we take the next analytical step: is there a structural feature that can 
predict successful performance and also explain the dynamics of group formation and 
dissolution? 
Intercohesion
To address this question we must first identify the relevant groups in network terms. 
Our case differs from those of Burt and Uzzi, for whom group boundaries (e.g., the 
members of a team project, the members of a musical) are given prior to the analysis. 
Business groups in Hungary – unlike those in East Asian economies where analysts can 
refer to directories listing the members of Japanese keiretsu or South Korean chaebol – 
do not exist as named places on the economic landscape. 
We adopt a measure of cohesion to identify the components of business groups, using 
the guiding theoretical principle that cohesive group structures need not necessarily be 
exclusive.2 That is, we are deliberately attuned to the possibilities that network struc-
tures can be cohesive and overlap. As Simmel ([1922] 1964) observed in the Web of 
2 Clustering algorithms used by network analysts typically parse cohesive structures into sepa-
rated communities with a resulting blind spot to multiple group membership. In his article 
on the social group concept, for example, Linton Freeman asserts that overlapping only occurs 
between groups from different social contexts (such as work, kinship, and friendship), and once 
the context is clarified, there is little, if any, overlap (Freeman 1992). We argue that partitioning 
social networks into disjunctive social groups is artificial, driven more by limitations of meth-
odological vision than by sociological insight. Joint appointments in academic departments 
constitute an overlap of two or more departmental groups. Nuclear families form as the overlap 
of maternal and paternal kinship groups. It is not exceptional to participate in more than one 
circle of friends. A more realist perspective thus acknowledges that social groups can be cohe-
sive and overlapping. 
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Group Affiliations, a person is frequently a member of more than one cohesive group at 
a given time. For Simmel, such multiple-group membership was a source both of indi-
viduation for the person and of social integration for the larger collectivities involved. 
In our population of firms in Hungary we might find, for example, a power plant that is 
linked to other power plants in a cohesive group, while also cohesively tied with power 
distributors and coal mines, linked to other heavy industry companies in a different 
cohesive group, and associated in a group with banks. 
Recent work in social network methodology acknowledges that actual network struc-
tures can be composed of overlapping cohesive groups (Moody/White 2003). Our ana-
lytical contribution is to recognize that, if cohesive groups can overlap, there is a dis-
tinctive structural position at the intersection. That is, from a methodological residual, 
we point to the intersecting location as a sociological object worthy of theoretical re-
flection. We develop a concept, intercohesion, to refer to the intersection of mutually 
inter penetrating, cohesive structures. Actors in this intercohesive position are multiple 
insiders, participating in dense cohesive ties that provide close familiarity with the op-
erations of the members in their group. Because they are members of more than one 
cohesive group, they have familiar access to diverse resources. This combination of fa-
miliarity and diversity facilitates the work of recombining resources. Intercohesion is 
closure without being closed off.
Our emphasis on familiarity and diversity does not imply, however, that we see the 
entrepreneurial work of innovative recombination3 as achieved by the summation of 
closure/cohesion and brokerage/connectivity. Figure 1 illustrates the structural position 
of intercohesion in contrast to brokerage and closure. Our identification of distinctively 
intercohesive processes (as opposed to an additive operation of the structure of inter-
nal group ties and the structure of external group ties) rests on conceptual differences 
about entrepreneurship. For the adherents of the additive school, innovation is basically 
conceptualized as a process of germination: bridging or brokerage ties bring the seeds 
of ideas and information to the nurturing soil of trusting relationships of cohesion. We 
have no doubts that ideas and information are often vital; our question is whether the 
activity of productive recombination involves only (or even primarily) resources that 
can flow or circulate. 
We conceptualize entrepreneurial recombination as more complex than the importa-
tion and implementation of novel ideas. In our view, the idea problem is itself an action 
problem. That is, the most innovative ideas are not “out there” in the environment of the 
group. Instead of waiting to be found, they must be generated (Kogut/Zander 1992). It is 
3 We are drawing on Schumpeter’s definition of entrepreneurship as “the carrying out of new 
combinations.” “As a rule, the new combinations must draw the necessary means of produc-
tion from some old combinations … development consists primarily in employing existing 
resources in a different way, in doing new things with them” (Schumpeter 1934). For a neo-
Schumpeterian statement in the field of economic growth models, see Weitzman (1998).
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one thing to recognize an already-identified pattern, but quite another to make a new 
association. In this sense, the process of innovation is paradoxical for it involves a curi-
ous cognitive function of recognizing what is not yet formulated as a category. As John 
Dewey ([1938] 1998) and the pragmatists argued, it is only in the process of attempt-
ing to make a transformation in the world that new problems can even be formulated. 
Generating novel recombinations is itself a kind of production requiring coordination 
and cooperation across different communities. 
In their study of new product development in cellular telephones, blue jeans, and medi-
cal devices, Lester and Piore (2004) demonstrate that each of their cases of radical in-
novation involves combinations across disparate fields: fashion jeans are the marriage 
of traditional workmen’s clothing and laundry technology borrowed from hospitals 
and hotels; medical devices draw on both basic life sciences and clinical practice; and 
cellular phones recombine in novel form radio and telephone technologies. They con-
clude that “without integration across the borders separating these different fields, there 
would have been no new products at all” (Lester/Piore 2004: 14–15).4
For us, the telling phrase in this passage is “integration across the borders …” Lester and 
Piore do not refer to “contacts” across borders, for it is not enough for different com-
munities to be in contact. Recombinant innovation requires that they interact. For these 
reasons, the conventional pairing of access to diversity is insufficient. 
4 Because innovation, in this view, involves bringing together incompatible traditions, we should 
not expect that the process will be harmonious. With hindsight, it is easy to see that faded fash-
ion blue jeans are a recombination of workmen’s clothing and laundry technology. If we can 
say that “of course!” cellular phones are the marriage of the radio and the telephone, it is only 
because, as Lester and Piore show, the respective communities worked from the starting point 
of their differences. 
Figure 1 Brokerage and entrepreneurship
Brokerage 
 
 
Entrepreneurship
Structural hole Intercohesive position
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Deep access for generating new problems, new knowledge, and new capabilities (as 
opposed to transferring already accepted ideas) requires considerable trust, hence fa-
miliarity. Such access can only be achieved by being an insider, an accepted member of 
a group. Therefore, we argue that productive recombination in the business-group con-
text requires familiar access to resources that are not provided by the narrow bandwidth 
of the slender ties of bridging and brokerage.5
Yet these ties cannot be so cohesive as to constitute a single group: to be able to recog-
nize the potential for novel recombinations, entrepreneurship requires access to diverse 
sets of resources6 – access that is only possible by being a member of two or more cohe-
sive groups. The distinctive structural properties of the intercohesive position provide 
mechanisms for achieving the diverse familiarities required for recognizing resources 
and for their productive recombination. 
To test these ideas, we correlate the performance of groups and the extent to which they 
are intercohesive. We expect that more intercohesive groups will perform better than 
more insular ones. 
Instability and coherence 
Establishing correlations between structures and performance in a cross-sectional con-
text leaves unaddressed the question of durability: are the ties transitory or are they 
indicative of a sustainable, self-generating pattern? While testing whether intercohesive 
structures are performance enhancing, we further analyze whether these same struc-
tures are self-perpetuating or self-destructive.7 From a theoretical perspective, intersec-
5 Bridging can only have as great an impact on cohesive groups as a two-step path length. Mem-
bers of bridged groups are, at best, friends of friends. The strength of impact between groups 
is limited by the weak ties that are between them. Whereas actors at the structural hole occupy 
a brokerage position at the gap and tax flows, intercohesive actors occupy an entrepreneurial 
position at the overlap and recombine resources.
6 In examining how different domains of knowledge are brought together to form something new 
and original, Lester and Piore argue that “ambiguity is the critical resource out of which new 
ideas emerge. … The cell phone emerged in the space created by the ambiguity about whether 
the product was a radio or a telephone; by playing with that ambiguity, the device became 
something that was different from either of them” (Lester/Piore 2004: 54). Lester and Piore 
further observe that radio and telephone technologies each claim a distinct commercial and en-
gineering tradition, with the segment of the radio industry from which cellular technology was 
derived being particularly distinctive, based on two-way radio mounted in police cars and fire 
engines. “The cultural differences between radio and telephone engineering were deep rooted” 
(Lester/Piore 2004: 17). 
7 Founding statements in the field of network analysis were attentive to issues of duration and 
temporality. Moreno and Jennings (1937: 371), for example, defined cohesion as “the forces 
holding the individual within the groupings in which they are.” At mid-century, Festinger, 
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tion points are locations of structural tension where multiple routines of operation and 
schemas to organize resources are at work. As prominent locations of restructuring 
agency, such intersecting social structures can be engines of social change from within 
(Sewell 1992).8
 Our examination of the role of intercohesion in the dynamics of group evolution stems 
from our conception of entrepreneurship. As Schumpeter observed, enterpreneurship, 
while fostering innovative recominbations, also contributes to “creative destruction” 
(Schumpeter 2003). Expressed in network analytic terms, entrepreneurial structures 
are likely to destabilize groups. As Uzzi and Spiro’s (2005) findings suggest, stability in 
itself is not the most favorable outcome; indeed, some disruption can be beneficial. We 
therefore test not only whether the creative tensions of intercohesive familiarity and 
diversity are performance enhancing in the first instance, but also whether these same 
tensions foster a creative disruption that disperses group members, who become avail-
able for later regrouping. We expect that the recombinant opportunities provided by 
the intercohesive location will have performance-enhancing effects at the group level. 
We further expect that these benefits come at the cost of group stability. 
Overlapping membership can be disruptive for group coordination, relations of recip-
rocal trust, and a sense of fairness. Those with multiply cohesive attachments might 
seem to follow strategies that are not transparent to those with single membership, a 
situation that may hinder coordination. In the face of the ambiguous loyalties of the 
intercohesive actors, other members might suspect they are being exploited or manipu-
lated; the lack of commitment and time devoted by those with multiple memberships 
to a given group might lead to group-level dysfunction, perhaps even fracture and frag-
mentation. Intercohesion, we therefore expect, will be negatively correlated with cohe-
sive group stability. 
If intercohesion represents a process of creative destruction, are business groups forced 
to choose between seeking stability or high performance? An historical perspective sug-
gests an alternative, whereby business groups keep fragmentation within manageable 
limits. Viewed in a dynamic year-to-year timeframe, we expect to find a system of mem-
Schachter, and Back’s (1950: 164) study of social pressures in informal groups addressed “the 
total field of forces which act on members to remain in the group” (see McPherson/Smith-
Lovin 2002 and Friedkin 2004 for discussion). In this emphasis they echoed Simmel, whose 
publication in an early issue of the American Journal of Sociology was titled “The Persistence of 
Social Groups” (Simmel 1898). 
8 By analyzing the dynamics of intersecting business groups, we follow theoretical insights on 
structure and agency most prominently formulated by William Sewell (1992). Sociological ar-
guments involving structures are typically aimed at explaining stability, closure, and reproduc-
tion. To explain social change, the opening of new possibilities, and ruptures in social reproduc-
tion, sociologists look for evidence of external shocks, forces from the outside. Sewell argues 
for a conception of structure that enables change from within. He argues that the intersection 
of structures, social groups in our case, helps explain change without reference to external im-
pacts. 
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bership turnover that appears in considerable flux. But the very notion of the business 
group (and the literature on long-lasting business groups) suggests some degree of co-
herence that endures longer than simply from one year to the next (Mizruchi/Stearns 
1988; Granovetter 2005). In other words, can considerable instability be squared with 
the concept of business group as a coherent entity? To address this question, we apply 
an historical analysis to complement our dynamic (year-to-year) analysis. 
In our view, the concept of the business group is not simply a network-analytic con-
struct; it is an historical network construct. From that perspective, cohesive group struc-
tures in a synchronic frame are the building blocks of the larger collectivity constituting 
the business group within a longer historical timeframe. These nuclear groups can be 
connected across time to other groups through member exchange. By tracing these ties, 
we can construct an historical-sociological object shaped by patterns of common an-
cestry. In other words, we turn from nuclear groups to the broader “kinship structures” 
of business organization. 
To identify the patterns of these kinship structures, we develop a concept of lineages 
of cohesion through which we trace chains of ancestral continuity reaching as far back 
in time as twelve years. Our intuition is that nuclear groups which share an ancestry 
might stay close to one another, connected by the intercohesive sharing of members and 
a common, repeatedly interwoven line of descent. A common ancestry makes group 
formation easier because routines of collaboration are already familiar. This familiarity 
facilitates the emergence of intercohesive positions: groups that share an ancestry might 
be less likely to have radically different routines and cultures of collaboration, thus re-
ducing the attendant coordination costs of the intercohesive position. 
We find that some business-group lineages operate through a single line of succession. 
Yet just as often, we find more complex lineages, ones that branch in one “generation,” 
reconsolidate in the next, and repeat these processes of exploration and reconsolidation 
over successive years with intercohesion playing a decisive role in this splitting and re-
weaving. Groups connected by member-exchange operate as larger collectivities which 
absorb and hence limit the scattering of members from destabilized groups and thus 
mitigate the disruptions caused by intercohesion. Instead of becoming dispersed across 
the full range of groups in the entire economy, groups break up to rejoin with others 
near them, thereby regrouping their resources in a fresh yet familiar combination. In-
stability thus becomes member recombination. In short, churn is consistent with pat-
terned coherence as business groups cope with the uncertainties of their environment 
by keeping group fragmentation within manageable limits. 
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Data and Methods
Data
The dataset that we have assembled includes the complete histories of personnel ties 
among the largest enterprises in Hungary spanning the years 1987–2001. We define 
large companies as those listed in the annual ranking of the top 500 firms (based on 
revenue) for any year from 1987 to 2001. Our inclusion rule results in a population 
of 1,696 firms. This population of firms represents more than a third of employment, 
about half of Hungarian GDP, and almost all export revenues (Figyelö 2002). 
We define economic officeholders as senior managers and members of the boards of direc-
tors and the supervisory boards of these large enterprises. Personnel data on economic 
officeholders were transcribed directly from the official files of the twenty Courts of 
Registry where Hungarian firms are obliged to register information about ownership 
and personnel. These registry files contain the names and home addresses of all manag-
ers who have signatory rights (entitled to sign documents that become legally binding 
on the firm). The files also list the members of the board of directors and the super-
visory board. For each firm, we have recorded the names of all signatories and board 
members who held office in the period studied, as well as the exact dates when they as-
sumed and left office. Our dataset on economic officeholders contains 72,766 names. 
Beyond economic officeholders, we have also collected the names of all political office-
holders in Hungary during this same period. For the years 1990–2001, we define politi-
cal officeholders as every elected politician from the Prime Minister, to the Members 
of Parliament, to the mayors of all municipalities, including the top three levels in the 
hierarchy of the national government ministries (encompassing cabinet ministers and 
their political and administrative deputies). For the period prior to free elections, we 
define political officeholders as all members of the Politburo and the Central Commit-
tee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, as well as government ministers and their 
deputies.9 This covers the political elite under state socialism. For all periods we record 
the party affiliation of each officeholder and the exact dates of tenure in office. Our 
dataset on political officeholders covering the period from 1987–2001 contains 16,919 
names. By merging the lists of economic and political officeholders we can precisely 
identify, for any given enterprise in any given month, whether that company had an 
economic officeholder who was also a current or former political officeholder affiliated 
with a particular political party. 
9 Data on political and government officeholders were collected from the National Bureau of 
Elections (which holds records on all elected political officeholders) and from the Hungarian 
News Agency (which maintains records on all government officials entering or exiting office). 
Whereas the Communist Party’s Central Committee is analogous to the parliament of the sub-
sequent democratic period, the Politburo was akin to the role of the government in the later 
period. Names of political officeholders in these years from 1987–89 were gathered from a com-
prehensive CD-ROM publication (Nyírö/Szakadát 1993).
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We define two companies as having a personnel tie if a manager or a board member of 
one company sits on the board of another company. We record personnel ties as sym-
metrical, with a starting and ending date for each tie. The models in this study use an 
annual time resolution, with personnel ties recorded at the last day of each year. We 
define a firm as having a political affiliation when one of its economic officeholders is 
also a current or former political officeholder,10 and we record the party affiliation of 
that political officeholder as the party affiliation of the firm. Political affiliations are 
thus personnel ties connecting firms and parties.11 
For each firm we also collected data on its annual revenues, capitalization, employment, 
industrial classification, privatization history, and types of owners (state, domestic pri-
vate entity, or foreign owner).
Identifying cohesive groups with the “clique percolation method”
To identify cohesive groups we adopt a method that starts from cohesive localities, recog-
nizes groups independent of the global network environment, and identifies intercohe-
sive positions. We use the clique percolation method (CPM) developed by physicists to 
uncover the overlapping community structure of complex networks (Palla et al. 2005), 
a method recently demonstrated as a suitable tool to analyze the evolution of cohesive 
groups (Palla/Barabasi/Vicsek 2007).
The clique percolation method starts from a clique of k nodes, a k-clique. In social net-
work analysis, cliques were often rejected as a useful metric of cohesion because they 
can highly overlap with other cliques. For example, a network of ten nodes can have two 
cliques of nine that have eight nodes at their overlap. The standard way of resolving this 
problem was to parse cohesion by recording the number of times two nodes co-par-
ticipated in cliques. Use of this similarity as input for cluster analysis yielded exclusive, 
non-overlapping cohesive regions in the network (Wasserman/Faust 1994). 
Whereas standard modeling partitions cohesion at the global network level by counting 
similarities at the node level, CPM is grounded in strictly local properties at the clique lev-
10 The motivation to include former as well as current political officeholders comes from our in-
terviews with managers of large firms. As one CEO noted: “In Hungary there is no such thing as 
an ex-politician. Once a politician, always a politician.” 
11 We do not record a personnel tie between two firms when the tie is created by a political of-
ficeholder. Two firms might invite the same politician or ministry official to sit on their boards, 
not because they wish to establish a tie to one another, but because they seek a political and/or 
government connection. Political affiliations are about personnel ties between parties and firms 
and not between firms. Including a personnel tie between these firms would introduce noise 
in the data that would potentially blur the patterns of personnel ties created to foster business 
collaboration.
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el. Instead of regarding clique overlap as a problem to overcome, it regards clique overlap 
as the starting point for identifying cohesion. (See Appendix for details on this method.)
Although developed by physicists, the method improves standard approaches in so-
cial network analysis and resonates with new departures from the conventional models. 
Most importantly for our purposes, a group identified by the CPM method can overlap 
with another group. Thus, CPM is in line with Everett and Borgatti (1998), who rec-
ognized the limitations of forced partitioning in various algorithms and pointed to the 
utility of clique adjacency as a theoretical solution.12 By relaxing clique membership in 
favor of clique adjacency, hence capturing group overlaps, CPM achieves greater socio-
logical realism that allows for closer approximation to the notion of community than 
does the concept of a sociometric clique. In a social community – unlike in a network 
clique – everyone is not necessarily connected to everyone else. We use CPM to identify 
groups in all years in our dataset from 1987 to 2001. 
Group performance
If intercohesive recombination contributes to entrepreneurship and innovation at the 
group level, intercohesive groups should outperform exclusive ones. Does intercohe-
sion contribute to group performance? To answer this question we first need to identify 
a suitable metric of performance and then isolate the contribution of intercohesion to 
performance. 
Profitability, although a widely-used indicator of performance, has questionable valid-
ity in the postsocialist setting. With high taxes and changing government regulations, 
profits can easily be manipulated – or, euphemistically speaking, “optimized” – depend-
ing on prevailing regulations. At a time when most firms were undergoing restructuring 
programs, profitability was not a practical metric to gauge firm performance. Instead of 
turning immediate profits, the key to survival was obtaining and keeping markets and 
thus securing revenues. We choose therefore to focus on revenue dynamics. 
We consider the simplest test to be the correlation between intercohesion at year t and 
revenue growth from year t to t +1. For a given group in a given year, intercohesion is 
defined as the number of groups with which that given group overlaps. Revenue growth 
is the growth rate at group level measured in real terms (corrected for inflation). This 
correlation between intercohesion and revenue growth is significant (with p = .049) and 
positive, although weak (R = .088). This indicates that groups with more intercohesive 
ties grew slightly faster. 
12 As Everett and Borgatti demonstrate, a network of 21 nodes can have as many as 2,187 cliques. 
The prevalence of overlapping in this case is clearly a far departure from what we would think 
of as meaningful group processes. 
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Does higher revenue growth in groups with intercohesion accrue only at the intersection? 
If intercohesion operates similarly to brokerage, we expect that firms at the intersection will 
see a faster increase in their revenues, compared to firms with only one membership. To an-
swer this question we computed the same correlation between intercohesion (now defined 
as the number of additional memberships held at the firm level) and revenue growth. This 
Pearson correlation is not statistically significant (p = .127), which indicates that the benefits 
of intercohesion are realized at the group level and do not appear distinctly at the level of 
the individual firms occupying the intercohesive position. The mechanisms of intercohe-
sion seem to differ from gatekeeping and brokerage, where benefits – additional revenue-
generating possibilities – would accrue at the gatekeeping firm spanning the two groups. 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Independent variables Mean Sd. Min. Max.
Intercohesion 2.707 2.746 .000 19.000
Group stability from t to t +1 .514 .259 .120 1.000
Group stability from t–1 to t .438 .282 .000 1.000
Revenue growth from t to t +1 1.587 3.945 .170 63.190
Negative growth from t to t +1 .544 .499 .000 1.000
Top quartile growth from t to t +1 .249 .428 .000 1.000
Intracohesive processes
Group size 4.661 1.168 4.000 11.000
Capital size of the largest firm 9.355 1.241 1.000 10.000
Size difference 1.507 1.650 .000 9.000
Financial members .722 1.101 .000 8.000
Industry homogeneity .409 .317 .000 1.000
Extracohesive processes
Brokerage 19.242 10.870 .000 44.000
Bridging ties 11.217 11.806 .000 72.000
State-owned proportion .255 .267 .000 1.000
Foreign-owned proportion .253 .231 .000 1.000
Politicized proportion .223 .182 .000 .800
Political mix .260 .439 .000 1.000
Governing party tie .910 1.007 .000 5.000
Controls
Year 96.594 2.903 89.000 101.000
Group age 2.817 1.820 1.000 11.000
Newly formed group .113 .317 .000 1.000
Labor efficiency (log) .700 .530 -.550 2.824
Capital efficiency (log) –2.636 .652 –4.513 .447
Sum of revenues (log) 4.067 .701 2.400 5.701
Industry
Energy .048 .213 .000 1.000
Mining .015 .121 .000 1.000
Chemical .151 .466 .000 4.000
Metallurgy .061 .253 .000 2.000
Heavy industry .400 .836 .000 5.000
Light industry .331 .680 .000 3.000
Wood and textile .140 .396 .000 3.000
Food industry .627 1.104 .000 8.000
Construction .258 .878 .000 6.000
Wholesale .421 .655 .000 4.000
Retail .367 .659 .000 4.000
Transport .102 .319 .000 2.000
Services .650 .869 .000 4.000
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To further test the relationship between growth and intercohesion and to isolate this re-
lationship from other predictors of revenue growth, we construct multivariate models. 
Our goal is to evaluate whether there is a significant relationship between intercohesion 
and growth even if we introduce variables of intracohesive processes (such as group size 
or homophily), extracohesive processes (primarily those of brokerage and bridging), 
and control variables, such as industry composition and efficiency.
For each group in our dataset, we have a score of real revenue growth. From this con-
tinuous variable we construct two categorical dependent variables capturing the dis-
tinctive processes of revenue decline and growth. Groups that are more entrepreneurial 
should achieve higher performance, but entrepreneurship does not guarantee perfor-
mance. Thus we also expect that more entrepreneurial groups are not buffered from 
declining performance. 
Revenue decline records whether the revenues of the group declined during the year in 
question. High revenue growth records whether the group belonged in the most suc-
cessful 25 percentile of groups in the overall sample (revenues for this top quartile cor-
responded to at least eight percent annual growth, controlling for inflation). We have 
two reasons for transforming our ratio-scale variable into two categorical variables. The 
technical reason is that the distribution of revenue growth is highly skewed – there are 
many groups with modest growth and few with extremely high growth. The second 
reason is substantive – we believe that the predictors of preventing revenue loss and the 
predictors of achieving high performance are distinct.
Our first independent variable is intercohesion: the number of groups with which a 
given group overlaps. We expect intercohesion to lower the probability of a revenue 
decline and to increase the probability of high revenue growth.
Our second set of independent variables represents intracohesive processes. The first 
variable is group size, the number of firms in the group. Similar to Simmel’s sociology of 
numbers, we expect that larger groups will have different revenue dynamics than small-
er ones have, as it is less likely that a large group achieves extraordinary growth. The 
second variable registers processes of homophily based on homogeneity in the industry 
profile.13 We measure this industry homogeneity by the numerical difference between 
the first- and second-most prominent industry categories in the group. If the group is 
entirely made up of one industry, this variable is equal to one. If there are two equally 
13 Homophily has been shown to be an important factor contributing to cohesive affiliation 
(McPherson/Smith-Lovin/Cook 2001). McPherson and Smith-Lovin (2002: 13) define homo-
phily as “the positive relationship between similarity (on almost any dimension) and the prob-
ability that two people will have a network connection between them.” Although McPherson 
has not studied business groups, the most pertinent dimension of similarity in this context is 
homogeneity of industry profile. If homophily is operating among our Hungarian firms, cohe-
sive groups concentrated in the same industry should be more likely to exhibit stability than 
those of greater industrial heterogeneity. 
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represented industry categories, this variable is equal to zero. Three other variables refer 
to processes of economic power and dominance in stabilizing or destabilizing the group. 
Size of the largest firm is measured in deciles of capitalization, ranging from 1 (smallest 
firms) to 10 (largest firms). The expectation is that powerful economic players can hold 
a group together (Thye/Yoon/Lawler 2002). To assess the effects of relative economic 
dominance, we record size difference as the size-decile difference between the largest 
and second largest firms in the group. A larger value indicates a more clearly dominant 
player in the group in terms of size. Whereas Thye et al. (2002) expect that the equality 
of power fosters group stability, Gould’s (2003) formulation would predict that equal-
ity of power would lead to conflict and group breakup. The variable financial members 
records the number of financial firms that are members of a given group. Following 
Mizruchi and Stearns (1988), we expect groups with financial members to have inferior 
performance. 
Our third set of independent variables represents extracohesive processes. For each 
group we record being brokered as the number of other groups to which the group is 
connected by an intermediary. We also record bridging ties, the number of other groups 
that are reachable with a direct tie from the group in question. These variables repre-
sent brokerage as recently reformulated by Ronald Burt (2005). Whereas Granovetter 
(1973) would expect that groups with bridging ties will have higher performance, we 
are also attuned to the possibility that being brokered has negative implications on per-
formance (Fernandez-Mateo 2007).
Among extracohesive processes, we also consider the reach of the group into the politi-
cal field. This dimension is salient because our case involves profound economic dis-
location in the context of a simultaneous political transformation (Stark/Bruszt 1998). 
Business groups are seen as especially suitable vehicles for political affiliation in such 
emerging markets (Khanna/Rivkin 2001). We include three variables to tap various as-
pects of these processes. Politicized proportion records the proportion of group-member 
firms having party affiliations through personnel ties. A group exhibits political mix 
when we find affiliations to parties on both the left and the right. Governing party ties 
records a group having a political affiliation to a currently governing party. 
The final variables in this set of extracohesive processes involve links to owners out-
side the group.14 State-owned proportion records the proportion of group members for 
which the state is a significant owner. Foreign-owned proportion similarly records the 
proportion of group members in foreign ownership. 
14 Our data set contains detailed information about firms’ ownership structure. For each firm we 
can record whether it has sizeable state ownership and sizeable foreign ownership, as well as 
details in the timing of any changes in such ownership. Our definitions of significant state and 
foreign ownership follow procedures detailed in Stark and Vedres (2006).
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Table 2 Logistic regression prediction of revenue decline or high growth
Independent variables
Declining revenue  
(yes = 1)
Top quartile revenue growth 
(yes = 1)
Intercohesion –.041 .210***
Intracohesive processes
Group size –.469*** –.144
Capital size of the largest firm –.046 –.588***
Size difference .061 –.159
Financial members .536*** –.319
Industry homogeneity .753* –.948**
Extracohesive processes
Brokerage –.026* –.006
Bridging ties .019 –.040**
State-owned proportion .385 .425
Foreign-owned proportion –.430 –.355
Politicized proportion .984 –2.904***
Political mix –.046 –.507
Governing party tie –.109 .376*
Controls
Group stability from t-1 –1.685*** .342
Year –.064 –.037
Group age .033 .162
Newly formed group –.480 –.049
Labor efficiency (log) –.980*** 1.385***
Capital efficiency (log) –.189 .563**
Sum of revenues (log) –.446* –.308
Industry
Energy –.181 –.884
Mining .741 1.880*
Chemical .283 .407
Metallurgy .212 –.858
Heavy industry .397* –.028
Light industry .613*** –.274
Wood and textile .524* –.039
Food industry .367* .232
Construction .102 .516**
Wholesale .616*** –.313
Retail .304 –.278
Transport .563 –.505
Services .431** .142
Constant 9.850 –7.637
N 430.000 430.000
–2LL 520.588 400.756
R2 .192 .245
% correctly classified 67.100 77.900
χ2 (df) 65.022 (33) 76.679 (33)
p-value .000 .000
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
As control variables, we include year as well as group age, defined as the average number 
of years that pairs of group members have spent in groups together. We include spe-
cific industry categories, an indicator of whether the group was newly formed by firms 
that had not belonged to any groups in the previous year, labor efficiency (measured as 
revenues over number of employees), and capital efficiency (measured as revenues over 
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capitalization). To correct for skewness of the distribution on these latter two variables, 
we take the logarithms.
Both models – the model of declining performance and the model of high perfor mance – 
pass the Hosmer-Lemeshow test for fit and Pregibon’s link test of model specification. 
Tolerance and variance-inflation factors were within conventional bounds for all inde-
pendent variables, indicating that multicollinearity should not be a concern. To test for 
sensitivity in defining the cut point of high performance at the top 25 percent, we ran 
the high performance model with dependent variables representing the top 30, 20, 15, 
10 and 5 percent of revenue growth. In all of these models, the sign and significance of 
the intercohesion coefficient was the same. 
In Table 2 we see that intercohesion does not buffer against revenue decline, but it is 
a strong predictor of high growth. It should be kept in mind that, by definition, all 
the groups we examine in Table 2 are cohesive. Intercohesive groups outperform their 
counterparts, who lack this ambiguous yet recombinative advantage. 
Turning to intracohesive variables, we see that larger group size makes decline less likely 
without contributing to growth. For business groups, there is safety in numbers – small-
er groups are more at risk of decline. Having a dominant member of large size makes 
it more difficult for a group to achieve high growth, probably because for large firms a 
high rate of growth means a large increase in revenue volume. Homophily is a disad-
vantage. Industry homogeneity increases the probability of decline and decreases the 
probability of high performance. Groups of more heterogeneous composition are ad-
vantaged. This does not apply, however, to groups that include members from finance. 
Groups with financial members are significantly more likely to face declining revenues. 
This result might not be surprising to scholars who study business groups: ties to banks 
are often associated with financial troubles and decreasing performance. 
Looking at personnel ties reaching to other business groups, we see that effects on 
performance diminish as distance increases. Groups with more two-step ties to other 
groups (mediated through brokers) are slightly less likely to decline but show no ad-
vantage in high performance. Groups with ties at the closest reach (not even one step 
away but established through the interpenetrating ties of intercohesion) outperform 
groups that are exclusive, regardless of how intensively or extensively they are embed-
ded. The number of bridging ties to members of other groups decreases the probability 
of high performance. This finding stands out in a sharp contrast to our findings on 
intercohesion. Bridging ties – circuits for the circulation of ideas – do not contribute 
to group success. This starkly contrasts the positive contribution of intercohesion. This 
finding underscores the importance of the entrepreneurial generation of ideas through 
recombination, as opposed to the reliance on imported ideas from other areas of the 
network. 
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Playing party politics is a tricky business. While political contacts do not offer protec-
tion against decline, only the most narrow, highly targeted strategy has payoffs. More 
politicized groups have little chance of achieving high growth. Groups that are overly 
committed to a party put the trust of their business partners in jeopardy. Groups can 
only benefit from party politics when they have a tie to a currently governing party. 
Intercohesion and group stability operate as mirrored opposites. Group stability buffers 
groups from revenue decline and does not contribute to top quartile revenue growth. 
Stability in group membership enables reciprocity, solidarity, and mutual assistance to 
act as a kind of safety net, thereby preventing severe market loss in the group. But trust 
and improved communication within the group are not assets that stimulate high levels 
of growth: stability in itself can be a conservatizing closure. 
Intercohesion and group stability
Having analyzed how intercohesion is related to group performance, we turn to ques-
tions of group stability. To define and measure group stability, we refer to Simmel’s 
article “Persistence of Social Groups,” where he argues that it is meaningful to speak 
of group identity, despite shifting membership and low institutionalization, if there is 
some membership continuity in contiguous stages: 
We may express this schematically as follows. If the totality of individuals or other conditions 
in the life of the group is represented by a, b, c, d, e and in a later moment by m, n, o, p, q, 
then we may nevertheless speak of the persistence of identical selfhood if the development 
takes the following course: a, b, c, d, e – m, b, c, d, e – m, n, c, d, e – m, n, o, d, e – m, n, o, p, 
e – m, n, o, p, q. In this case, each stage is differentiated from the contiguous stage by only one 
member, and at each moment it shares the same chief elements with its neighboring moments. 
(Simmel 1898: 670–671)
We draw on this insight in our analysis of group stability. For the first year of our data-
set we use CPM to identify each of the cohesive groups of firms (for example, cohesive 
group 1 is composed of firms a, b, c, d, e; cohesive group 2 is composed of f, g, h, i, j; 
and so on). For the second year we identify the cohesive groups existing at that time. 
(Following Simmel’s lead, we can call them, f, b, c, d, e; a, g, h, i, j; v, w, x, y, z; and so 
on.) Because network formation is slow at first and the number of groups appearing 
at the very beginning is only very small, we modify Simmel’s scheme. Instead of simply 
following the first established groups, we identify all the groups that exist from 1987 to 
2001. That is, we identify and record, for each year, all of the cohesive groups that exist 
in that year. By observing the composition of all groups in t1 and those in t2 , we can 
record the proportion of the members of any given group that remained cohesively tied 
– which is our metric of stability – for all pairs of years. 
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To measure the stability of groups, we record the flow of members between all groups 
in adjacent years. A group is completely stable from one year to the next if all members 
of the group identified in the first year appear together in a group in the next year. At 
the other extreme, a group dissolves if none of the members at t1 appears in any groups 
at t2 . Between these extremes, a group at t1 can split into segments of various sizes that 
are present in groups at t2 . To measure such intermediate levels of stability, we score the 
average size of the pieces from t1 that appear in groups at t2 , thereby normalizing for the 
size of the source group. 
Table 3 Linear regression prediction of group stability
Independent variables Group stability 
Intercohesion –.018***
Intracohesive processes
Group size –.028**
Capital size of the largest firm –.009
Size difference .010
Financial members .006
Industry homogeneity .029
Extracohesive processes
Brokerage –.008***
Bridging ties .001
State-owned proportion –.078*
Foreign-owned proportion .061
Politicized proportion .021
Political mix .004
Governing party tie .003
Controls
Group stability from t-1 .204***
Year .023***
Group age –.013*
Newly formed group .127***
Labor efficiency (log) .037*
Capital efficiency (log) –.033**
Sum of revenues (log) .004
Industry
Energy –.041
Mining .086
Chemical .032
Metallurgy –.003
Heavy industry .029**
Light industry .045***
Wood and textile .068***
Food industry .031**
Construction .057***
Wholesale .032*
Retail .019
Transport –.009
Services –.001
Constant –1.613***
N 467.000
Adj. R2 .472
F (df) 13.671 (33)
p-value .000
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
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To test whether intercohesion has its own predictive power in the context of competing 
explanations, we use a multivariate regression model, with group stability as the de-
pendent variable. The independent variables are the same as those that we used in our 
models of group performance. 
We find a negative correlation between intercohesive ties and group stability. The mean 
correlation across all years is –0.55, ranging from –0.37 to –0.70. This regression model 
passed Pregibon’s link test of model specification; tolerance and variance-inflation fac-
tors were within conventional bounds for all independent variables: multicollinearity 
should not be of concern. Table 3 presents the results of our regression models predict-
ing group stability. 
We see that multiple membership ties of intercohesion decrease group stability. This 
finding suggests that the presence of multiple insiders stresses the fabric of cohesion. 
Actors who are ambiguously committed produce destabilizing tensions inside these 
groups. The interpenetrating ties, through which mutually intercohesive groups adhere, 
disrupt stability. Intercohesive adhesion erodes and disperses group cohesion. 
Of the intracohesive processes only group size is relevant: larger groups are less stable. 
Of the various extracohesive linkages only two are relevant to group stability: brokerage 
and state ownership. State ownership destabilizes groups, which is a manifestation of 
the privatization process: large numbers of state-owned enterprises were reorganized 
and sold. This reorganization erodes the stability of groups with state-owned firms. 
The number of brokered ties to other groups is significantly correlated with decreased 
group cohesion, a finding that suggests that brokers adversely impact the structures 
they exploit. This finding is in line with the idea that the price of brokerage is borne by 
those who are connected by the broker (Fernandez-Mateo 2007). In addition to mate-
rial losses, our findings show another externality of brokerage: the erosion of brokered 
structures. This structural erosion can eventually diminish the opportunities of broker-
age themselves. 
Among the control variables, we are not surprised to find that group stability in the 
preceding year is related to stability in the current year. Group stability has inertia. We 
also find a positive trend toward greater group stability leading out of the postsocialist 
period – groups are more stable in the later years. While newly formed groups without 
a prehistory of cohesion are stable in the first year of their existence, there is a slight 
disadvantage to old groups. 
Groups with higher labor efficiency are more stable, while groups with higher capital 
efficiency are less stable. A group with a high amount of capital and few employees is 
much more stable than a group with low capitalization and many employees. This latter 
type of group was the typical target of reorganization, which disrupted group continu-
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ity. In addition, several industry categories are significant, and feature varying levels of 
group stability when compared with the reference category of agriculture.
To summarize, we found that intercohesion is disruptive: groups where membership is 
not exclusive suffer a loss of stability. Interpenetrating contact between business groups 
is destructive even beyond what we would expect to happen by chance – groups seem to 
break down more often if one or more of their members takes on multiple affiliations. 
Recombinant lineages of cohesion
Intercohesion represents a process of creative disruption. Business groups seem to face 
a fundamental contradiction; they appear forced to choose between striving either for 
stability or for high performance. On the one hand, choosing exclusivity can yield sta-
bility with attendant protection from failure but not with the possibility of high perfor-
mance. Yet on the other, choosing intercohesive nonexclusivity opens up entrepreneurial 
possibilities and the promise of high performance, although at the risk of disintegration. 
This leaves groups with two possibilities: they either stay exclusive and stable, content 
with modest, although secure performance, or they engage in inter-cohesive linking, 
possibly outperforming most other groups before they disintegrate.
However, our data indicate there is a third possibility that renders creative disruption 
manageable: groups connected by member exchange operate as larger collectivities, 
which absorb and hence limit the scattering of members from destabilized groups, thus 
mitigating the disruptions caused by intercohesion. Instead of becoming dispersed 
across the whole range of groups in the entire economy, groups break up to rejoin with 
others near them and to regroup their resources in a fresh yet familiar combination. 
Instability thus becomes member recombination. 
Our analyses thus far have worked with data that record changes from one point in time, 
t, to the next, t +1. In this section we turn from a dynamic approach to an historical one 
by following the pattern of member flows across the entire epoch. In preceding sections 
the unit of analysis was a group at a given point in time, and we estimated stability and 
effects on performance at the t to t +1 interval. In this section, however, our unit of 
analysis is a collectivity of groups linked across time, and we follow the entire history of 
these collectivities through the historical structure of membership flows.
From nuclear groups we now turn to broader kinship structures of business organi-
zation. The flows of members trace lineages among cohesive groups. Even though a 
group might not have shared any members with another in the past, it can still be con-
nected to it through a chain of ancestry. Our intuition is that groups sharing an ancestry 
might stay close to one another, connected by intercohesive sharing of members and 
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a common, repeatedly interwoven line of descent. A common ancestry makes group 
formation easier because routines of collaboration are already familiar. This familiarity 
facilitates the emergence of intercohesive positions: groups that share an ancestry might 
be less likely to have radically different routines and cultures of collaboration, which 
would thus reduce the coordination costs attendant at the intercohesive position. 
When are two groups related by a link of descent? According to Georg Simmel’s idea of 
the persistence of identical selfhood in groups (Simmel 1898), a group of five members, 
a, b, c, d, e, is strongly related to a subsequent group with m, b, c, d, e members. It is also 
clear that a group with a, b, c, d, e is not related to a subsequent group of f, g, h, i, j. Be-
tween fully related and unrelated exist degrees of strength for a lineage tie. Being faithful 
to the founding impetus of social network analysis, we believe that the properties of 
a group are not a summary of the properties of its individual members. Instead, they 
emerge from the structure of interactions among members. This fundamental insight 
informs our definition of a lineage tie. It is doubtful that two groups can be related – in 
the sense that there is continuity in how the group operates and the purpose it serves – 
if they share only one member. Because group qualities stem from interaction along 
the ties that the group contains, it takes at least two members to establish continuity 
between their old group and their new group. Continuity in codes of communication 
and collaboration depend on some continuity in interaction. Therefore, continuity in 
trust and in routines of reciprocation and resource-sharing cannot be transmitted by 
one member alone. In line with this insight, we define a lineage tie between a group at 
time t and another group at time t +1 as the sharing of at least two members. 
The idea of lineage ties extends the notion of the persistence of groups. Lineage ties 
link groups at adjacent points in time as ancestors or descendants. A lineage of cohesion 
represents a separate evolutionary path. Persistence concerns the length of the lineage: 
a group that persists over a long period, even if members are replaced along the way, 
is connected back in time to a long chain of groups. Persistence concerns only one 
dimension of a lineage – its length. Lineages can also have thickness – involving mul-
tiple groups at a given point in time, all connected by a shared ancestry. While some 
lineages are simple chains of linear persistence, other lineages are more complex, with 
branching and reunification. In this case, the structure of lineage ties is more complexly 
organized: members leaving a group will have a strong tendency to reform a group with 
others from the same lineage. 
Figure 2 presents an example of an interwoven lineage. In 1995, this lineage starts with 
one group that has three intercohesive ties to groups outside the lineage. In the follow-
ing year, this group splits into two groups, each of which has two intercohesive ties to 
one another as well as several overlaps with outside groups. Going forward, the two 
groups are not stable, but they do not dissolve entirely; the lineage is continued. The 
groups exchange some members while retaining others, so that in 1997, the following 
year, there are again two groups, although the composition of each differs from that of 
the previous year. These groups are interconnected by overlapping membership with 
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two intercohesive ties between them. In 1998, these two groups split into three groups, 
linked again by shared members but without intercohesive ties to any outside groups. 
The three groups then merge into two in 1999, and by 2000 these two have merged once 
again into one group. 
The lineage presented in this example displays some distinctive structural properties. 
Later generations of groups, for example the two groups in 1999, share an ancestry 
of cohesion that goes all the way back to 1995 (in the postsocialist context, an entire 
epoch). Beyond simply sharing the legacy of group routines from 1995, their lines of 
descent were repeatedly interwoven in such a way that they can, in fact, both trace a lin-
eage to almost all of the preceding groups. This interwoven lineage contains groups that 
are linked by intercohesion at each point in time. These groups are not stable: almost 
all of them split up from one year to the next. Although the membership of individual 
groups is volatile, the membership of the lineage is stable. This is not to say that stability 
means stasis: at any point in time, groups within the lineage are recombined. 
We argue that the existence of interwoven lineages follows from an organizing prin-
ciple that retains members of destabilized groups which are close to one another. But 
lineages – straight or interwoven – might also form when ties are created at random, 
i.e., when a firm in a cohesive group has an equal probability of being a member of any 
of the groups in the coming year. To test clustering under such random conditions, we 
Figure 2 An example of an interwoven lineage
 
Circles represent groups, with size proportional to membership. Solid arrows represent member 
continuity of at least two firms; a dashed line indicates an intercohesive group intersection.
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compare the observed size distribution of lineages with the size distribution in simu-
lated datasets. If we find that lineages of similar size emerge often in random data, we 
can reject our hypothesis that lineages are a result of business organizing. 
We ran simulations to test randomness as an explanation for the existence of lineages. 
In our simulations we fix the degree distribution of incoming and outgoing lineage ties 
in each year, while randomizing the particular connections. In such a simulated dataset, 
splitting occurs with the same probability in each year as it does in the observed data-
set in that given year, but members that split apart choose their target groups at ran-
dom. The same holds for mergers – mergers happen with the same frequency as in the 
observed dataset, but the particular mergers are randomly generated. Each simulation 
yields a complete lineage dataset from 1987 to 2001. We generated 1,000 such datasets 
to estimate the distribution of lineage sizes when members migrate to other groups 
randomly.
Our findings indicate that it is very unlikely that the observed lineages are a result of 
randomly connected ties. As an illustration, Figure 3 shows the ten largest lineages in 
a representative simulated dataset (where clustering statistics were closest to the mean 
of all simulations). Figure 4 shows the ten largest lineages in the observed dataset. The 
most striking difference between the simulated and the observed lineages is that the 
largest lineage in the simulated data is much larger than the second largest. Our first 
measure of lineage size distribution is the relative size of the largest lineage to the sec-
ond largest. In our simulations, the largest lineage is, on average, 32 times the size of 
the second largest lineage. In our observed dataset, the largest lineage is about twice as 
large as the second. Only in eight of the one thousand simulations was this ratio smaller 
than or equal to two. 
Another measure of clustering is the relative size of the largest lineage component to the 
size of the complete dataset. In the observed data the largest component encompassed 
only 14 percent of the total dataset. In the one thousand simulated datasets, the largest 
component occupied, on average, 69 percent of a given dataset. In only four of the one 
thousand simulations was the largest component as small as the largest component in 
the observed dataset, namely 14 percent. Lineages do not happen by accident. 
We also found that interwoven lineages have dense intercohesive ties among the groups 
they contain. Looking at all the pairs of groups where intercohesion is possible (groups 
that coexisted in the same year), we found that the density of intercohesive ties is much 
higher for those pairs of groups that are within the same lineage. The density within 
interwoven lineages is 49 percent, i.e., almost half of the pairs of groups within such 
a lineage are connected by intercohesion. For example, in an interwoven lineage with 
four groups, three of the six possible pairs would be connected – enough to make the 
lineage a connected component. The density for pairs of groups that do not share a 
lineage is only three percent. As a comparison, we computed the same density indices 
for the typical simulated lineage dataset displayed in Figure 3. In this simulated dataset, 
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the intercohesion density within lineages is only five percent – in contrast to 49 percent 
in the observed data. 
In Figure 4 we have also highlighted one of the interwoven lineages. This is the steel 
industry group “Heavy Metal” where Stark (1996) conducted ethnographic research 
during the early postsocialist period. This group is an interesting illustration of our 
social sequence method for identifying business groups across time. Heavy Metal is one 
of the relatively few business groups that exist as a named entity in the landscape of the 
Hungarian economy. In fact, the name of each firm indicates the group to which they 
belong. Of the eighteen firms with the Heavy Metal designator in our dataset, seven-
teen of them are classified by our method in this interwoven lineage. The history of 
this business group, which started in 1992 and was studied by Stark in 1993–94, shows 
that organizational experimentation was not restricted to the early postsocialist period. 
Through repeated recombinations of subgroup memberships, the coherence of Heavy 
Metal is maintained amidst changes in ownership and inflows of foreign direct invest-
ment, as well as across changes in government and shifting political affiliations. 
In the context of business groups, a focus on lineages of cohesion highlights the fact 
that the organizing principle is more complex than merely bringing firms into close 
cohesive contact. The organization of business groups also involves strategic separa-
Figure 3 The ten largest simulated lineages of cohesion
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tion – keeping sets of members apart while, at the same time, maintaining historical 
coherence. The historical unfolding of organizing business groups leaves its traces as 
lineages of cohesion. Lineages highlight an important balancing between two forces. 
While the friction of intercohesion repeatedly dismantles groups, the shared lineage 
keeps members within a sphere of exchange in which member resources are redistrib-
uted and recombined. Intercohesion prevents groups from freezing into the defensive 
buffer of exclusivity, while lineage prevents groups from exploding and thus dissipating 
the resources they accumulated. 
Conclusion
Social network analysis has produced a rich array of analytic concepts and powerful 
methods for studying structural features of economic action. From Granovetter’s (1985) 
concept of embedded action, for example, sociology developed a systematic approach 
to predicting economic behavior from the structure of social ties. Methods of social 
network analysis designed to identify cliques, cores, clans, and other cohesive groups 
provided powerful operationalizations to the embeddedness concept. With White’s 
Figure 4 The ten largest observed lineages of cohesion
The interwoven lineage 
of “Heavy Metal”
32 MPIfG Discussion Paper 09 / 3
concept of structural equivalence came the idea that actors might behave similarly not 
because they are linked together but because they share a common location within the 
more general pattern of ties. Using the method of block modeling, White and his col-
leagues turned scholarly attention away from the conventional understanding of net-
works as “who knows whom?” to argue that absent ties were equally important (White/
Boorman/Breiger 1976). Along this line of thought, network analysis extended its atten-
tion to include patterns in the holes or missing spaces in social structure. Granovetter’s 
(1973) idea of weak ties and Burt’s (1992) concept of structural holes developed these 
insights into systematic analyses of brokerage opportunities, access to information, and 
structural constraint. Recently, Watts’ concept of small worlds highlighted the joint im-
portance of cohesive linking and long-distance ties reaching across structural voids for 
understanding flows of information (Watts 1999) and robustness in response to crisis 
(Dodds/Watts/Sabel 2003).
Common to all these endeavors is the attention given to network topology. Each of the 
concepts – embedding, structural equivalence, weak ties, structural holes, small worlds 
– refers to specific topological network features. Our work contributes to these efforts by 
developing the concept of intercohesion and then identifying its corresponding topo-
logical feature where cohesive group structures fold into each other. While retaining the 
insight that structural properties are built from the presence and the absence of ties (the 
absence of ties across groups, exclusive of the intercohesive position, is significant in 
defining the groups as distinct units), we point to a distinctive position where cohesive 
network structures overlap and interpenetrate. Whereas Burt’s conception of structural 
hole identifies a network location for brokerage, intercohesion identifies a network lo-
cation for the entrepreneurial activity of recombination. 
Thus, in contrast to Burt’s image of a structure that bridges or spans a hole, we consider 
a site where structures fold together. Behind this difference of imagery lies a further dif-
ference in conceptualizing what is transpiring within networks. In the case of brokerage, 
social networks are channels, a means of transportation, a system of communication. 
Like electrical circuits, they conduct: the counterparts of electrons are, above all, pieces 
of information but also rumors and resources that flow through the network circuitry. 
According to this idea, network positions are important to the extent to which they are 
irreplaceable in maintaining flows between larger segments of the network. 
If the flow or movement of information is the critical activity occurring through 
the conduit or at the contact point across the structural hole, it is the generation of 
knowledge through recombination that is the critical activity occurring at the site of 
the intercohesive position. Correspondingly, the electricity metaphor is replaced by 
more suitable ones from molecular chemistry. Instead of seeing networks as the wiring 
through which informational electrons flow, we should think of networks as a kind of 
molecular bonding in which ties connect nodes into larger groupings that represent a 
new molecular quality and not merely an extension of circuits to further atoms of the 
network. Intercohesion establishes strong connections between network molecules to 
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generate a more complex material of creative alliances. In this view of a social network, 
flows are secondary. Information can be codified; but knowledge is a practice, bound 
up with particular socio-technical ensembles. The more innovative the knowledge, the 
less likely it is to be fully codified and easily transmitted apart from these ensembles. 
Through the overlapping of strong ties bonding to more than one group, intercohesion 
provides opportunities for mixing or recombining knowledge practices. Intercohesion 
represents the location where new ideas are generated, as opposed to a location where 
informational flows are taxed. 
Whereas social network analysis has given us a plenitude of concepts for studying the 
structural properties of networks, the field has yielded far fewer concepts for analyz-
ing the temporal or historical features of networks. No one could have predicted this 
shortcoming based on the origins of this field of research, for Georg Simmel, one of the 
founding figures of network analysis, did indeed address the temporal dimension in 
one of the first issues of the American Journal of Sociology in 1898. In his essay “Persis-
tence of Social Groups,” Simmel pondered whether it was meaningful to speak of group 
identity in cases of shifting membership and low institutionalization. 
Simmel’s challenge persists. More than a century later, social network analysis faces 
a fundamental theoretical and methodological problem when moving from a cross-
sectional to a dynamic and historical concept of group cohesion. How can we identify a 
group across time in network terms? Can it change its composition and still preserve its 
group identity? The problem is simple where groups are named, catalogued, and regis-
tered, e.g., the Supreme Court, the Youngstown Garden Club, the Mitsubishi keiretsu, or 
the Samsung Group. Despite membership changes over a century, the Department of 
Sociology at the University of Chicago remains such because of institutional continuity. 
But the social networks forming Hungarian corporate groups, like many of the groups 
studied by network analysts, lack such institutionalization. How do we study group 
evolution where groups might not be named? 
Our work addresses this challenge directly. Drawing on Simmel’s insights, we elaborate 
a conception of historical group identity based on membership continuity in contigu-
ous stages. Such membership continuity need not be absolute, but there must be some 
overlap of (at least two) group members to bequeath groupness from one year to the 
next. The resulting operation yields another new way of representing network topol-
ogy – a lineage of cohesion – in which structure can be displayed and analyzed across 
the temporal dimension. As we saw, some lineages take the form of a single, branchless 
line. But others – interwoven lineages – are built up through splitting and reuniting in 
an ongoing pattern of interweaving. In developing an historical network analysis, we 
combine attention to the structure (characteristic of social network analysis) with at-
tention to temporal processes (characteristic of historical sociology). The results make 
it possible to identify larger collectivities that would otherwise be invisible in static 
snapshots. This ability to recognize pattern in historical network data will have wide 
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applicability for phenomena with low levels of institutionalization such as social move-
ments, emerging industries, or new schools of scientific or literary thought. 
Thus, as a direct counterpart to the topography of intercohesion along the synchronic 
dimension, we have identified interwoven lineages across the diachronic dimension. In 
a manner not dissimilar to the intercohesive position – where we find recombination 
occurring at points of diversity within familiarity – we also find, along the historical 
dimension, that groups form and reform along lines of patterned coherence, separat-
ing to encompass greater diversity and rejoining to benefit from familiarity. Whether at 
the scale of the intercohesive position or along the historical dimension of interwoven 
lineages, the recombinant work of innovation requires the dual refrain of familiarity 
and diversity.
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Appendix: The “clique percolation method”
The clique percolation method operates on clique adjacency. K-cliques are adjacent if 
they share k-1 vertices. A clique of four is adjacent to another clique of four if they share 
three members. From adjacencies one can assemble a clique chain, traversing along 
clique adjacencies. The union of all k-cliques in such a chain forms a k-clique percola-
tion cluster if no more k-cliques can be added. This contiguous and highly cohesive 
region of the network is a cohesive group, within which a k-clique can percolate, or roll 
along, by always replacing only one of the k nodes. Using a k value of four, as we do 
in this study, yields cohesive groups where all members have ties to at least three other 
members in the group. 
Figure 5 illustrates the logic of the CPM method in identifying a small cohesive group. 
We start by identifying a 4-clique, and in step 1 this 4-clique is rolled along by replacing 
one node. In step 2, the 4-clique is rolled further along, and in the final step, step 3, the 
group is identified, as there is no further possibility to roll the 4-clique along.
The k parameter of the CPM method is adjustable. The choice of a lower k results in a 
more uneven distribution of group sizes. A k-value of one is of little use; if we consider 
the percolation of complete subgraphs of one node, this means that the whole network 
is one group. At this extreme value, the size distribution of groups is the most extreme – 
there is just one group that encompasses the whole network. A k of two means that 
we consider the percolation of complete subgraphs of two nodes, which is equivalent 
to considering the percolation of edges. In this case, cohesive groups are the discon-
nected components of the graph. The size distribution of components is very skewed, 
because a giant component containing an overwhelming proportion of nodes is a com-
mon feature of networks. Increasing the value of k to three means considering triangles 
(complete triads) as the percolating subgraph. Groups in this case are made of triangles 
sharing at least two nodes. The distribution of group sizes is more even, although in 
denser networks the largest triangle-percolation cluster can still be much larger than 
the second in size. Moving to a k of four is even more restrictive, since groups need to be 
dense enough to allow the percolation of complete subgraphs of four. In this case, the 
Figure 5 Illustrating the logic of the CPM algorithm
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distribution of group sizes is more even, and there might not be a group that is clearly 
the largest. 
We decided to use a k-value of four in identifying clique percolation clusters. Most ap-
plications of the CPM method found that there is a percolation transition between a 
k-value of four and three. While a k of four produces groups that are roughly of equal 
size, a k of three produces a highly skewed group-size distribution. Our data confirms 
this finding; with a k of three, the largest group is, on average, three times larger than 
the second largest group, while in some years it is five times larger. With a k of four, the 
largest group is, on average, 1.21 times larger than the second largest, and the maximal 
size distance is 1.57. Thus we decide to use k = 4 to identify cohesive groups with the 
CPM method.
Table 4 Group size distribution and node coverage with the CPM method  
at various k-values
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5
Year
Largest 
groupa
Node 
coverageb
Largest 
group
Node 
coverage
Largest 
group
Node 
coverage
Largest  
group
Node 
coverage
1989 18.40 48.76 1.25 20.85 1.00 5.65  – .00
1990 33.80 45.23 1.20 25.38 1.25 5.53 1.00 .95
1991 53.00 57.02 4.73 32.20 1.50 11.26 1.20 5.57
1992 53.30 61.72 4.85 38.83 1.57 14.93 1.17 7.05
1993 140.60 62.92 1.27 42.98 1.17 15.86 1.17 8.01
1994 106.86 63.13 1.47 45.48 1.13 16.44 1.29 7.26
1995 106.86 61.32 1.41 42.81 1.13 17.48 1.14 6.81
1996 69.18 60.12 5.00 43.38 1.10 21.36 1.17 9.69
1997 130.83 59.56 4.37 40.18 1.10 22.66 1.17 8.47
1998 131.67 58.41 4.33 40.97 1.38 22.08 1.17 7.28
1999 132.17 56.71 3.64 39.35 1.14 18.72 1.14 4.62
2000 109.14 55.11 3.41 37.65 1.14 15.75 1.14 5.60
2001 124.67 54.06 2.11 37.05 1.13 14.89 1.29 5.02
Mean 93.11 3.00 1.21 1.17
Min. 18.40 1.20 1.00 1.00
Max. 140.60 5.00 1.57 1.29
a Cells indicate the relative size of the largest group compared to the second largest group. 
b Cells contain percentages of all firms in the dataset in that given year.
Stark, Vedres: Intercohesion and Entrepreneurial Dynamics in Business Groups 37
References
Ahmadjian, Christina L./James R. Lincoln, 2001: Keiretsu, Governance, and Learning: Case Studies in 
Change from the Japanese Automotive Industry. In: Organization Science 12(6), 683–701.
Baum, Joel/Bill McEvily/Tim Rowley, 2007: Better with Age: The Longevity and the Performance Impli-
cations of Bridging and Closure. Unpublished manuscript. Toronto: University of Toronto. 
Bearman, Peter S., 1991: Desertion as Localism: Army Unit Solidarity and Group Norms in the U. S. 
Civil War. In: Social Forces 70(2), 321–342.
Brudner, Lilyan A./Douglas R. White, 1997: Class, Property, and Structural Endogamy: Visualizing 
Networked Histories. In: Theory and Society 26(2–3), 161–208.
Burt, Ronald S., 1992: Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press.
——, 2005: Brokerage and Closure. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
——, 2007: Second-Hand Brokerage: Evidence on the Importance of Local Structures for Managers, 
Bankers and Analysts. In: The Academy of Management Journal 50(1), 119–148.
——, 2008: Information and Structural Holes: Comment on Reagans and Zuckerman. In: Industrial 
and Corporate Change 17(5), 953–969. 
Davis, Gerald F./Mina Yoo/Wayne E. Baker, 2003: The Small World of the American Corporate Elite, 
1982–2001. In: Strategic Organization 1(3), 301–326.
Dewey, John, [1938] 1998: The Pattern of Inquiry. In: Larry A. Hickman/Thomas M. Alexander 
(eds.), The Essential Dewey, Volume 2: Ethics, Logic, Psychology. Bloomington, IN: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 169–179.
DiMaggio, Paul (ed.), 2001: The Twenty-First-Century Firm: Changing Economic Organization in In-
ternational Perspective. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Dodds, Peter Sheridan/Duncan J. Watts/Charles F. Sabel, 2003: Information Exchange and the 
Robustness of Organizational Networks. In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
100(21), 12516–12521.
Doreian, Peter/Frans Stokman (eds.), 1997: Evolution of Social Networks. London: Routledge. 
Erikson, Emily/Peter Bearman, 2006: Malfeasance and the Foundations for Global Trade: The Struc-
ture of English Trade in the East Indies, 1601–1833. In: American Journal of Sociology 112(6), 
195–230.
Everett, Martin G./Stephen P. Borgatti, 1998: Analyzing Clique Overlap. In: Connections 21(1), 49–
61.
Fernandez-Mateo, Isabel, 2007: Who Pays the Price of Brokerage? Transferring Constraint through 
Price Setting in the Staffing Sector. In: American Sociological Review 72(2), 291–317
Festinger, Leon/Stanley Schachter/Kurt W. Back, 1950: Social Pressures in Informal Groups: A Study of 
Human Factors in Housing. New York: Harper.
Figyelö, 2002: Kétszázak klubja 2001. In: Figyelö Top 200. Special Issue.
Freeman, Linton C., 1992: The Sociological Concept of “Group”: An Empirical Test of Two Models. 
In: American Journal of Sociology 98(1), 152–166.
Friedkin, Noah E., 2004: Social Cohesion. In: Annual Review of Sociology 30(1), 409–425.
Gould, Roger V., 2003: Collision of Wills: How Ambiguity about Social Rank Breeds Conflict. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Gould, Roger V./Roberto M. Fernandez, 1989: Structures of Mediation: A Formal Approach to Bro-
kerage in Transaction Networks. In: Sociological Methodology 19, 89–126.
Granovetter, Mark, 1973: The Strength of Weak Ties. In: American Journal of Sociology 78(6), 1360–
1380.
——, 1985: Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. In: American 
Journal of Sociology 91(3), 481–510.
——, 1994: Business Groups. In: Neil J. Smelser/Richard Swedberg (eds.), The Handbook of Economic 
Sociology. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 453–475.
38 MPIfG Discussion Paper 09 / 3
Granovetter, Mark, 1995: The Economic Sociology of Firms and Entrepreneurs. In: Alejandro Portes 
(ed.), The Economic Sociology of Immigration. New York: Sage, 128–165.
——, 2005: Business Groups and Social Organization. In: Neil Smelser/Richard Swedberg (eds.), 
Handbook of Economic Sociology. Second Edition. Princeton University Press, 429–450.
Guillén, Mauro F., 2001: The Limits of Convergence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
——, 2002: Structural Inertia, Imitation and Foreign Expansion: South Korean Firms and Business 
Groups in China, 1987–1995. In: Academy of Management Journal 45, 509–525. 
Hamilton, Gary G./Nicole Woolsey Biggart, 1988: Market, Culture, and Authority: A Comparative 
Analysis of Management and Organization in the Far East. In: American Journal of Sociology 
94(s1), S52–S94.
Johnson, Juliet, 1997: Russia’s Emerging Financial-Industrial Groups. In: Post-Soviet Affairs 13(4), 
333–365.
Juhasz, Gabor, 2001: Partpenzugyek (Party Finances). Budapest: Aula.
Khanna, Tarun/Jan W. Rivkin, 2001: Estimating the Performance Effects of Business Groups in 
Emerging Markets. In: Strategic Management Journal 22, 45–74. 
Kim, Eun Me, 1997: Big Business, Strong State. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Kogut, Bruce/Gordon Walker, 2001: The Small World of Germany and the Durability of National 
Networks. In: American Sociological Review 66(3), 317–335.
Kogut, Bruce/Udo Zander, 1992: Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities and the Replica-
tion of Technology. In: Organization Science 3(3), 383–397.
Koza, Mitchell P./Arie Y. Lewin, 2000: The Co-Evolution of Strategic Alliance. In: Organization 
Science 9(3), 255–264. 
Lester, Richard K./Michael J. Piore, 2004: Innovation: The Missing Dimension. Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press. 
Lincoln, James R./Michael L. Gerlach/Christina L. Ahmadjian, 1996: Keiretsu Networks and Corpo-
rate Performance in Japan. In: American Sociological Review 61(1), 67–88.
McMenamin, Iain/Roger Schoenman, 2007: Together Forever? Explaining Exclusivity in Party-Firm 
Relations. In: Political Studies 55(1), 153–173. 
McPherson, J. Miller/Lynn Smith-Lovin, 2002: Cohesion and Membership Duration: Linking Groups, 
Relations and Individuals in an Ecology of Affiliation. In: Edward J. Lawler/Shane R. Thye, Group 
Cohesion, Trust and Solidarity. Advances in Group Processes 19. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1–36.
McPherson, J. Miller/Lynn Smith-Lovin/James M. Cook, 2001: Birds of a Feather: Homophily in 
Social Networks. In: Annual Review of Sociology 27, 415–444.
Mizruchi, Mark S./Joseph Galaskiewicz, 1994: Networks of Interorganizational Relations. In: Stanley 
Wasserman/Joseph Galaskiewicz (eds.), Advances in Social Network Analysis. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications, 230–253.
Mizruchi, Mark S./Linda Brewster Stearns, 1988: A Longitudinal Study of the Formation of Inter-
locking Directorates. In: Administrative Science Quarterly 33(2), 194–210.
Moody, James A./Douglas R. White, 2003: Structural Cohesion and Embeddedness: A Hierarchical 
Concept of Social Groups. In: American Sociological Review 68(1), 103–127.
Moreno Jacob L./Helen H. Jennings, 1937: Statistics of Social Configurations. In: Sociometry 1(3/4), 
342–374.
Nyírö, András/István Szakadát, 1993: Politika Interaktív CD-Rom. Budapest: Aula.
Padgett, John F., 2001: Organizational Genesis, Identity, and Control: The Transformation of Bank-
ing in Renaissance Florence. In: James Rauch/Alessandra Casella (eds.), Networks and Markets. 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 211–257.
Padgett, John F./Christopher K. Ansell, 1993: Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400–1434. 
In: American Journal of Sociology 98(6), 1259–1319.
Padgett, John F./Paul D. McLean, 2006: Organizational Invention and Elite Transformation: The 
Birth of Partnership Systems in Renaissance Florence. In: American Journal of Sociology 111(5), 
1463–1568.
Palla, Gergely/Albert László Barabási/Tamás Vicsek, 2007: Quantifying Social Group Evolution. In: 
Nature 466(7136), 664–667.
Stark, Vedres: Intercohesion and Entrepreneurial Dynamics in Business Groups 39
Palla, Gergely, et al., 2005: Uncovering the Overlapping Community Structure of Complex Networks 
in Nature and Society. In: Nature 435(7043), 814–818.
Powell, Walter W., et al., 2005: Network Dynamics and Field Evolution: The Growth of Interorganiza-
tional Collaboration in the Life Sciences. In: American Journal of Sociology 110(4), 1132–1205.
Reagans, Ray E./Ezra W. Zuckerman, 2008: Why Knowledge Does Not Equal Power: The Network 
Redundancy Trade-off. In: Industrial and Corporate Change 17(5), 903–944.
Reuf, Martin/Howard E. Aldrich/Nancy M. Carter, 2003: The Structure of Founding Teams: Ho-
mophily, Strong Ties, and Isolation Among U.S. Entrepreneurs. In: American Sociological Re-
view 68(2), 195–222.
Róna-Tas, Ákos, 1998: Path Dependence and Capital Theory: Sociology of the Post-Communist Eco-
nomic Transformation. In: East European Politics and Societies 12(1), 107–131.
Schoenman, Roger, 2005: Captains or Pirates? State-Business Relations in Post-Socialist Poland. In: 
East European Politics and Societies 19(1), 40–75.
Schumpeter, Joseph A., 1934: The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press. 
——, 2003: Essays: On Entrepreneurs, Innovations, Business Cycles and the Evolution of Capitalism. 
New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. 
Sewell, William H. Jr., 1992: A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency and Transformation. In: Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology 98(1), 1–29.
Siegel, Jordan I., 2007: Contingent Political Capital and International Alliances: Evidence from South 
Korea. In: Administrative Science Quarterly 52(4), 621–666.
Simmel, Georg, [1922] 1964: Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations. New York: Free Press.
——, 1898: The Persistence of Social Groups. In: American Journal of Sociology 3(5), 662–698.
Smangs, Mattias, 2006: The Nature of the Business Group: A Social Network Perspective. In: Orga-
nization 13(6), 889–909.
Snijders, Tom A. B., 2001: The Statistical Evaluation of Social Network Dynamics. In: Sociological 
Methodology 31(1), 361–395.
Spicer, Andrew/Gerald A. McDermott/Bruce Kogut, 2000: Entrepreneurship and Privatization 
in Central Europe: The Tenuous Balance between Destruction and Creation. In: Academy of 
Manage ment Review 25(3), 630–649.
Stark, David, 1996: Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism. In: American Journal of 
Sociology 101(4), 993–1027.
Stark, David/Laszlo Bruszt, 1998: Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East 
Central Europe. Cambridge, MA : Cambridge University Press.
Stark, David/Balázs Vedres, 2006: Social Times of Network Spaces: Network Sequences and Foreign 
Investment in Hungary. In: American Journal of Sociology 111(5), 1367–1412.
Thye, Shane R./Jeongkoo Yoon/Edward J. Lawler, 2002: The Theory of Relational Cohesion: Review 
of a Research Program. In: Advances in Group Processes 19, 139–66. 
Useem, Michael, 1980: Corporations and the Corporate Elite. In: Annual Review of Sociology 6, 41–
77.
Uzzi, Brian/Jarrett Spiro, 2005: Collaboration and Creativity: The Small World Problem. In: Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology 111(2), 447–504.
Uzzi, Brian, 1997: Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of Embed-
dedness. In: Administrative Science Quarterly 42, 35–67.
Wasserman, Stanley/Katherine Faust, 1994: Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications. Cam-
bridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Watts, Duncan, 1999: Networks, Dynamics and the Small-World Phenomenon. In: American Journal 
of Sociology 105(2), 493–527.
Weitzman, Martin L., 1998: Recombinant Growth. In: Quarterly Journal of Economics 113(2), 331–
360.
White, Douglas, 2004: Network Analysis, Social Dynamics and Feedback in Social Systems. In: Cyber-
netics and Systems 35(2/3), 173–192. 
40 MPIfG Discussion Paper 09 / 3
White, Douglas R./Ulla C. Johansen, 2005: Network Analysis and Ethnographic Problems: Process 
Models of a Turkish Nomad Clan. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
White, Harrison C./Scott A. Boorman/Ronald L. Breiger, 1976: Social Structure from Multiple Net-
works I: Blockmodels of Roles and Positions. In: American Journal of Sociology 81(4), 730–780.
Windolf, Paul, 2002: Corporate Networks in Europe and the United States. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Wuchty, Stefan/Ben Jones/Brian Uzzi, 2007: The Increasing Dominance of Teams in the Production 
of Knowledge. In: Science 316(5827), 1036–1039.

Recent Titles in the Publication Series of the MPIfG
MPIfG Discussion Papers
DP 09/2
J. Beckert
Koordination und 
Verteilung: Zwei Ansätze der 
Wirtschaftssoziologie 
DP 09/1
J. Beckert, N. Besedovsky
Die Wirtschaft als Thema der 
Soziologie: Zur Entwicklung 
wirtschaftssoziologischer 
Forschung in Deutschland  
und den USA
DP 08/13
K. Thelen, M. R. Busemeyer
From Collectivism towards 
Segmentalism: Institutional 
Change in German Vocational 
Training
DP 08/12
M. Höpner
Usurpation statt Delegation: 
Wie der EuGH die Binnen­
markt integration radikalisiert 
und warum er politischer 
Kontrolle bedarf
DP 08/11
M. Kahancová
Embedding Multinationals 
in Postsocialist Host 
Countries: Social Interaction 
and the Compatibility of 
Organizational Interests with 
Host­Country Institutions
DP 08/10
A. Schäfer
Krisentheorien der 
Demokratie: Unregierbarkeit, 
Spätkapitalismus und 
Postdemokratie
MPIfG Working Papers
WP 09/2
P. Aspers
How Are Markets Made?
WP 09/1
F. W. Scharpf
Legitimacy in the Multilevel 
European Polity 
WP 08/7
W. Streeck
Von der gesteuerten 
Demokratie zum selbst­
steuernden Kapitalismus:  
Die Sozialwissenschaften in 
der Liberalisierung
WP 08/6
W. Streeck
Flexible Markets, Stable 
Societies?
WP 08/5
C. Deutschmann
Der kollektive „Buddenbrooks­
Effekt: Die Finanzmärkte und 
die Mittelschichten
WP 08/4
J. Beckert, W. Streeck
Economic Sociology and 
Political Economy: A 
Programmatic Perspective
WP 08/3
W. Streeck
Industrial Relations Today: 
Reining in Flexibility
WP 08/2
I. Troy, R. Werle
Uncertainty and the Market for 
Patents
MPIfG Books
W. Streeck
Re­Forming Capitalism: 
Institutional Change in the 
German Political Economy
Oxford University Press, 2009
R. Mayntz
Über Governance: Institutionen 
und Prozesse politischer 
Regelung
Campus, 2009
S. Burkhart
Blockierte Politik: Ursachen 
und Folgen von „Divided 
Government“ in Deutschland
Campus, 2008
L. Dobusch
Windows versus Linux:  
Markt – Organisation – Pfad
VS Verlag für Sozialwissen-
schaften, 2008
M. Höpner, A. Schäfer (Hg.)
Die Politische Ökonomie der 
europäischen Integration
Campus, 2008
C. Woll
Firm Interests: How 
Governments Shape Business 
Lobbying on Global Trade 
Cornell Studies in Political 
Economy
Cornell University Press, 2008
P. Manow
Im Schatten des Königs: 
Die politische Anatomie 
demokratischer Repräsentation
Suhrkamp, 2008
Ordering Information
MPIfG Discussion Papers
Order printed copies from the MPIfG (you will be 
billed) or download PDF file from the MPIfG website 
(free).
MPIfG Working Papers
Order printed copies from the MPIfG (you will be 
billed) or download PDF file from the MPIfG website 
(free).
MPIfG Books
At bookstores; abstracts on the MPIfG website.
www.mpifg.de
Go to Publications.
New Titles
Consult our website for the most complete and up-
to-date information about MPIfG publications and 
publications by MPIfG researchers. To sign up for 
newsletters and mailings, please go to Service on the 
MPIfG website. Upon request to info@mpifg.de, we 
will be happy to send you our Recent Publications 
brochure.
ERPA
MPIfG Discussion Papers and MPIfG Working Papers 
in the field of European integration research are 
included in the European Research Papers Archive 
(ERPA) which offers full-text search options:  
http://eiop.or.at/erpa.
